The Problem of Evil Revisited

Recently, I published an article on how the logical problem of evil does not succeed in its aims. However, after some poor phrasing on my part and the challenges posed by an atheist on my Facebook wall, I have decided to offer a response to the fuller threat to theistic belief the Problem of Evil poses.

I take the problem of evil at its most powerful form to be as follows: Christianity claims both that God created the world and that he sustains it. Christianity claims that God knows all things and is capable of all feats. Christianity claims that God is perfectly good, and wants only the best for his Creation. If each of these claims is true, though, then it is difficult to see why God allows the evil in the world to persist. The evil in the world thus appears to be at least strong and perhaps even conclusive evidence that at least one of these central claims of Christianity is false.

Now some theologians, such as St Augustine, have tried to short circuit this argument by saying that evil really doesn't exist, its just a 'privation' of good. When you say something is cold, you are saying that that thing is absent of heat. Cold is not a thing in itself, but the privation of heat. Likewise, darkness is the privation of light. In the same way, evil is just the absence of good. However, I do not find this very convincing. Just look around in the world, and you will see events of such great moral and natural evil which defy such reasoning. Even if we accept that evil does not exist, suffering is a very real presence in our experience. Its all very well saying evil doesn't exist, but how do you justify this to the mother who lost her baby, or the 16 year old girl diagnosed with terminal cancer, or the young man hacked down by soldiers for defending his family?

It is with this in mind I open my response. Evil exists, no question about it. The question is, can belief in God still be probable with this in mind? The atheist believes that the problem of evil shows the answer to this question to be a no. The probability that God, an all loving being and all powerful being, is so low, that belief in God is unjustified. This is because we can conceive of the universe being in a much better situation, with less evil. But is that the case?

Well the first problem with this response is that the proponent of such an argument seems to believe that if God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, then it should be obvious to us. There is literally no grounds for that assumption. The transcendent God is able to see the end of history, and is able to order history to fulfill his aims and purposes, through human free decisions. To see his ends come to fruition, God may well have to put up with evil along the way, which appear pointless to us in our limited frame of reference, but would be justified in God's wider frame of reference. In other words, due to our select few observations, it cannot be inferred that it is improbable God would have no morally justifiable reason for permitting evil.

This is not an appeal to mystery, but rather a recognition that humans have limited cognitive capacities. In other contexts this accepted widely: utilitarianism is heavily criticised because one could never estimate what would be the greatest good action for the greatest number of people, because there are so many possible contingencies that living by such a system is impossible for human minds. Due to our cognitive limitations, disastrous actions in the short term may be fantastic in the long term for the greatest number of people. Some short term boom may bring in untold misery (think of the economic collapse of 2008). Once we see that God has providence over the whole of history, it becomes apparent that we as limited observers are in no position to speculate on what the reasons are God may have for permitting the existence of evil with any confidence.

Secondly, if the Christian God exists, it would not be unexpected that evil also exists. This is because the ultimate goal of creation is not happiness, but knowledge of the divine. These two are often conflated, and quite dangerously so. If things were designed for human happiness by God, it is inconceivable why evil would exist, because that decreases happiness in this life. However, Christians affirm that ultimate fulfillment is found in God alone, and moral and natural evil may be instruments God uses to bring people into his kingdom. A view of history cannot be taken on this issue without baring this in mind, for events which seem utterly pointless in creating human happiness may have a purpose in giving a person greater knowledge of God. Moreover, God's purposes do not just concern this world, but the afterlife and eternal salvation. When God asks humans to bare suffering in this life, it is only with the prospect of heavenly joy and recompense in the eternal love he offers, and the longer we spend in heaven, the longer the previous suffering shrinks away compared to the overpowering love of Christ and the heavenly abode. If Christian theism is true, it is not so improbable that God and evil would both exist, and if you have read some of my earlier posts, you will see why I at least believe that Christianity is true. To summarise this point, the proponent of the problem of evil assumes that fulfillment comes from happiness, and not some other thing, such as knowledge of God, which we would expect on a Christian worldview at least.

Thirdly, probability arguments always rely on some background information. So we need to ask, what is the proponent of the problem of evil basing their probability on? What is it in respect too? The atheist says the existence of God is improbable. But in respect to what? To the evil in the world? Well, if that was the only aspect of reality, it would be hardly surprising that the existence of God is improbable. However, the background information one should use is not just the evil in creation but all the data the universe offers. I do not have room for it here, but I am convinced that arguments such as the Kalam Cosmological Argument, William Sorley's Moral Argument and William Alston's evaluation of religious experience all provide evidence from within the universe which even if we take the existence of evil, make the background probability of God's existence more probable than not. In any case, it would be premature to say the existence of God is improbable without assessing all the relevant evidence, not just evil.

To conclude, I believe the problem of evil is not in the end a problem for the Christian, for he can hold that both God and evil exist by assessing the argument and picking out its flaws: 1) it assumes we should know the reason why God would permit evil 2) It assumes the function of human life is to achieve happiness, not knowledge of God like in Christianity 3) It bases its probability on the background of evil alone, not all the available evidence. This would be my response to somebody proposing such an argument. Now I may have not done justice for the proponents, and if so, I would encourage supporters of it to offer a stronger case than for it. With that being the case, I still maintain that these points, which I have only briefly illustrated, demonstrate that the rational person can believe in God's existence being probable and evil existing.